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of enabling Poland to be admitted, at least *in extremis*, to the San Francisco Conference. For as the result of London and Washington's refusal, on April 18, to allow an invitation to be sent to the Warsaw Government, it looked as though Poland, the first victim of German aggression, might be absent from the discussion of the statute destined to preserve the world against the recurrence of similar attacks.

The invitation found the London Poles divided. Of the three organisations invited, M. Mikolajczyk, ex-President of the Council, and M. Stanczyk, Vice-President of the Central Executive Committee of the Polish Socialist Party, accepted; M. Witos declined the invitation on health grounds, and M. Zakowski, the representative of the Socialist Party, reflected the discord which had apparently developed in that party by refusing to join the delegation.

The trial of sixteen Poles who had been detained in Moscow for several weeks, charged with sabotage and anti-Soviet activities, interfered with the negotiations. In vain did the Poles in London try to secure their release, by emphasising the role these men had played in the Resistance; Marshal Stalin declared that the Conference must not prevent the trial from taking place. At the hearing certain of the accused pleaded guilty to acts of terrorism directed against Soviet troops, and attributable to the *Armija krajowa* (Armed Forces of the Interior), which had been recognised on the previous August 30[1] by the English and the Americans, and to a political organisation called *Niepodlegosc* (Independence). The verdict returned on June 21[2] was mitigated; the chief offender, General Okulicki, was condemned to ten years' imprisonment, while the remaining accused were either acquitted or received very light sentences.

The objects of this trial, synchronised with the Conference from which, on principle, was to come the reconciliation of the Warsaw Poles and the London Poles, seem to have been as follows. Firstly, to discredit the leaders of the Government-in-exile and their staffs; secondly, to give (by the verdict) an example of the Russians' spirit of moderation; and thirdly, to emphasise their unshakeable determination to put an end, once for all, to anti-Soviet propaganda on Polish territory.

So the agreement reached on June 23[n] found the atmosphere

1 [1944 -- Analyst]
2 [1945 -- Analyst]

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645 175 Communists, then rejoined the partisans in Bosnia and was elected President of the National Liberation Front.

• 687 175 The chief event of this period was the trial of General Draja Mihailovich, who had organised the earliest resistance to the invader, but was subsequently accused of collaboration with the Germans and the Italians. Arrested on the borders of Bosnia and Serbia, he was court-martialled on June 10, 1946, by the Military Tribunal of Belgrade, which condemned him to death on July 15. He was shot. Some American airmen had vainly asked to bear witness in his favour. The Belgrade Government had documents published establishing his 'treason'; they reveal undeniable complicity with the enemy in the lower ranks, and, especially, the implacable intention of eliminating the Communists from the Resistance; the role of Mihailovich himself is less clearly shown—which explains the emotion his condemnation aroused in England and in America.

[829] The *Daily Telegraph* thus expressed itself on this condemnation: 'The long perspective of history will enable the truth about the much-discussed figure of Mihailovich to be more clearly perceived. His contemporaries can do no more than think that, caught up in the whirlwind of events beyond his control, he was a victim of Fate'.

In the same connection the British statesman, Noel Baker, declared that the decision to suspend aid to Mihailovich during the war had been taken as the result of numerous denunciations from various sources, alleging that he was no longer adequately contributing to the war effort. 'Subsequently', he said, 'it became evident that certain of his lieutenants were actively collaborating with the Germans'.

793 687 175 657 No less sensational was the trial of the Catholic Archbishop of Zagreb, Mgr. Aloysius Stepinac. This followed proceedings against numerous members of his clergy, notably that involving some Slovene priests, in December, 1945, at Ljubljana. The bishop of that town, Mgr. Rozman, a refugee in Italy, was condemned to eighteen years' imprisonment.

[808] The action against the Croatian priests accused of collaboration was prepared in January, 1946, by a violent press and radio campaign, denouncing the Archbishop's relations with the *Oustachi* of Pavelich, by whom he had been decorated (in

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common with the Croatian Orthodox Metropolitan, Hermogene Maximov, and the German Lutheran bishop, Popov).

Arrested on September 18, 1946, Mgr. Stepinac was tried, on the 30th of the same month, not only on the charge of intelligence with the enemy, but also of having, after the liberation, worked with the opponents of the régime. These charges (as well as that of having forcibly converted Orthodox Christians to Catholicism) were upheld by the judges, who condemned the prelate (on October 11) to sixteen years' hard labour, to the loss of his civic rights for a period of five years, and to the confiscation of all his possessions. In vain had the defence recalled the fact that Mgr. Stepinac had protested against the racial laws and collective reprisals, and that the allied press had, while the war was actually in progress, rendered homage to his courageous stand.[5]

Pope Pius XII, in a public speech, protested against this verdict, denying the compulsory conversions—which, moreover, are contrary to canon law. And, although Tito had declared that the proceedings were by no means the prelude to a campaign against the Church in Czechoslovakia, Christian circles throughout the world protested against what they called a 'religious trial'. The 115 Catholic archbishops and bishops of the United States, assembled in Washington for their annual Assembly, described the verdict as 'an outrage on justice'. The Archbishop of Westminster declared that, during the war, 'in Croatia the only voice raised against Nazism and its works had been that of Archbishop Stepinac'.

The Vatican, in an unofficial note, recalled the Church's sanctions against members of the laity sitting in judgement on a bishop, or guilty of any act of violence upon his person; it nevertheless continued to maintain its Nuncio in Belgrade—Mgr. Patrick Hurley, a priest of American nationality, who had entered upon his office at the beginning of the year. In October, 1946, it appointed a co-adjutor to the Bishop of Maribor and another to the Bishop of Ljubljana. (In the absence of a

[5] A Catholic Agency announced, at the end of February 1947, that the President of the Croatian Government, Dr. Bakarich, was said to have invited the prelate to sign his appeal, giving him reason to hope that he might be liberated and, with American support, go abroad. Mgr. Stepinac refused, not wishing to leave either his people or his diocese.

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186* 648 829 175 in the fight for liberation, at a time when Russia could not intervene. His dictatorial attitude, his personal prestige, aroused distrust on the part of the Kremlin. On the Yugoslav side, they were shocked by the conceit of the Russians, who lavished instructions and counsel on a nation which considered its own political experience superior to that of the Russians, and who, in the course of history, had won and rewon its independence entirely by its own efforts. Serbian pride, wounded by the demands made by Moscow, precipitated the rupture.

565 423 175 On the other hand, Yugoslavia is peopled by an emancipated peasantry; it has made its own agrarian reforms, and has not had to suffer the yoke of political dynasties (as has been the case with Rumania), nor (like Hungary) that of a landed aristocracy. Communism could not get a footing there, either in the same form or at the same speed, as in the other 'popular democracies'.

Finally, the systematic enslaving of the economy of Yugoslavia to Russian interests was bound, one way or another, to provoke violent reaction in Belgrade.

186* 665 648 175 •687 It was nevertheless a surprise for the world when, on June 28, 1948, the Kominform communiqué pronounced the condemnation of Tito and his collaborators, accused of desiring to establish themselves by a régime of terror, of over-estimating the possibility for their country of safeguarding its independence without the assistance of the other Communist Parties; finally, of seeking the support of the capitalist States.

Dr. Pijade, the theoretician of Tito's régime, felt able to reveal[1] that the Kominform's resolution simply reproduced a text prepared in Moscow: he stated that the hands of waverers had been forced by a lying assurance that the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party contained spies on behalf of England and the United States.

175 648 [439] Then began a diplomatic battle between Moscow and Belgrade: at first it took the form of a criss-cross exchange of notes, then that of an economic boycott and, finally, of a vast scheme to detach Yugoslavia from the other popular democracies and reduce her to isolation.

The diplomatic notes at first (July-August, 1948) dealt with the fate of Soviet citizens in Yugoslavia; then (August-

[1] Speech made on July 8, 1949, at Novi Sad.

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September) the role played by the Soviet Union in international conferences regarding Yugoslav claims to Southern Carinthia. In one of these notes (August 11) Moscow accused the Belgrade Government of acting 'not as an ally, but as an enemy of the Soviet Union'.

'We can establish Socialism without the U.S.S.R.', Tito had declared.

For a few months the Belgrade press attacked the Kominform, without going so far as to mention its real promoters. On May 30, 1949, for the first time, *Borba*, the organ of the Yugoslav Communist Party, openly attacked the Soviet Union, which it accused of seeking to foment the Yugoslav people against the Government. And Pijade denounced 'Russian nationalism', cloaked under the mantle of Marxist orthodoxy, 'which does not allow any other Communist Party to consider itself the equal of the Bolchevik Party, or any other State to raise itself above the level fixed for it by Moscow'. He accused the Soviet Union of recruiting traitors to form a 'pro-Stalin, anti-Tito front' in Yugoslavia.

The friendship and mutual assistance pacts concluded by the other popular democracies with the Belgrade Government were denounced during the same week: on September 28, 1949, the Kremlin gave the signal for these notices of termination. On October 1 Bulgaria annulled the pact of November 27, 1947, and was followed by Rumania in respect of the pact of December 19, 1947, and by Czechoslovakia (on October 4) in respect of the treaty of friendship of May 9, 1946, and the cultural agreement of April 27, 1947. The Warsaw Government had anticipated matters by declaring, as far back as September 8, 1949, that Tito's Government had 'trampled on and destroyed' the Polish-Yugoslav pact of March 18, 1946.

The heads of the Yugoslav diplomatic mission in Moscow, and of the Soviet mission in Belgrade, were recalled during the autumn of 1949, and the majority of their collaborators declared 'undesirable', on charges of espionage or sabotage. The cases brought, in Hungary and Bulgaria respectively, against Rajk, ex-minister (September) and Kostov, ex-Vice-President of the Council (December)—cases involving Yugoslavs—were so arranged as to bolster up the Soviet accusations against Tito and his role in the Balkans.

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648 175 • 687 The Yugoslav Government replied by trying, in Sarajevo, some White Russians, naturalised Soviet citizens, who, after having served the occupying authorities during the war, were said to have become agents for anti-Tito propaganda; on December 9 they were condemned to imprisonment for a term of years.

648 175 In the shade of Soviet-Yugoslav antagonism, the old quarrel between Belgrade and Sofia over Macedonia was reawakened.

Early in August, 1947, Tito and Dimitrov met at Bled and signed a protocol providing for closer collaboration between the two Governments: this protocol was to find its application in the 'pact of collaboration and mutual assistance' concluded on November 27 following, at Euxinograd.

648 563 175 [186] Yet, at Bled, there were signs of disagreement. Tito would have liked to see the formation of a Federation of Southern Slavs. But such a federation would imply the inclusion of Bulgarian Macedonia in the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—which would have the effect of committing the Macedonians in Bulgaria to a policy for the future, on the lines of the old Serbian aspirations. Dimitrov shelved the solution of the Macedonian problem until the federal pact should be concluded. The Yugoslavs then insisted that psychological conditioning for the union should be ensured by the granting of 'cultural rights' to the Macedonians in Bulgaria. Now the Sofia Government refused to consider the latter as a minority, and therein lay the germ of the new Bulgarian-Yugoslav crisis.

Later, on December 20, 1948, after the Soviet-Yugoslav rupture, Blagoje Neskovitch, Vice-President of the Belgrade Government, was to claim that the quarrel unleashed by the Kominform arose simply out of the pressure brought to bear by the Bulgarian leaders, with a view to securing recognition of their territorial claims on Vardar Macedonia.

Then Belgrade reproached the Bulgarian Popular Republic with having refused a statute of autonomy and the designation of a 'nationality' to the Pirine Macedonians.

648 175 Thereafter the Macedonian Question remained in the forefront of Bulgaro-Yugoslav relations: a Macedonian, Poptomov, became Minister of Foreign Affairs in Sofia and, when Bulgaria denounced the pact of November 27, 1947, Yugoslavia accused her of violating the peace treaty by refusing to pay the repara-

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described it as a 'crime against European civilisation', and on October 1 it was brought up at the Security Council by the French delegate, Parodi, during a discussion on Bulgaria's candidature for the United Nations. 648 696 829 175

In January, 1948, on the occasion of the signing of a treaty of mutual assistance with Rumania, the Bulgarian Premier, Dimitrov, risked an allusion to a project for the federation of the Balkan States, but this was immediately disavowed by the Kremlin. [185]

Dimitrov died on July 1, 1949; he was replaced as leader of the Government by Kolarov, and at the head of the Bulgarian Communist Party by his brother-in-law, Valko Tchervenkov.

The sentencing (March 8, 1949) of four Protestant pastors, accused of espionage, to life imprisonment, and the imprisonment of eleven others for a term of years, called forth vehement protests in the Christian world, and justified the sending of a diplomatic note by Great Britain, on March 12, in which these proceedings were described as a violation of Art. 2 of the peace treaty concerning 'fundamental liberties'.

The year 1949 was marked by progressive tension in the relations between Belgrade and Sofia. In September the Bulgarian Government denounced the treaty of friendship and, on October 6, the frontier agreement with Yugoslavia. This antagonism, which revived the Macedonian Question, reached a crisis at the trial of Traitcho Kostov, ex-Vice-President of the Council. Accused in March, by the Central Committee of the Communist Party, of 'flagrant errors' (the most serious accusation being that of having invoked the principle of State secrecy in order to withhold information of a commercial nature from representatives of the Soviet Union), Kostov found the charges gradually extended, until he was involved in a plot against the safety of the State, with the complicity of the Anglo-Americans and the agents of Tito. He was condemned to death, and executed on December 16. The Yugoslav press considered this charge as having been trumped up entirely with a view to compromising and discrediting Tito. 648 687 175 [208]

The municipal elections of May 15, 1949, gave the Communist-controlled Government of the 'Homeland Front' 92.1 per cent of the votes cast (370,000 blank votes); the legislative elections of December 18 raised this percentage to 666 175